On 23 March 1999 Javier Solana, who had been illegally and undemocratically authorised by the North Atlantic Council to take the decision to bomb Yugoslavia, gave the go-ahead for the bombing. He had just spent three days making phone calls to NATO heads of state to discuss the matter.

He gave as the reason for his decision to bomb Yugoslavia “the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’s refusal of the international community’s demands.”

He said there were three demands. Even if it were true that the demands had been rejected this would not have constituted a reason valid in international law, common sense, or morality for attacking another country with relentless bombing and missile attacks.

But the key demand had been met by the Yugoslav side, though not by the KLA. The second demand was clearly unreasonable in view of changed circumstances. The third demand was a very vague and would require a considerable team of independent investigators before a proper judgement could possibly be made. The demands were as follows:

1. “Acceptance of the interim political settlement which has been negotiated at Rambouillet;”

There was no settlement that had been negotiated at Rambouillet, of course, and it was not the fault of the Yugoslav government that negotiations were prematurely halted. The government requested that the talks be continued. It had agreed the key requirement which NATO had expressed in two ways.

On 17 January 1999 NATO required “a lasting political solution which provides greater autonomy for Kosovo and which preserves the territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.”

On 28 January 1999 it required “an enhanced status for Kosovo, [preserving] the territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and protecting the rights of all ethnic groups.”

On 30 January 1999 NATO repeated the requirement of 28 January.

The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’s government was in full agreement with this requirement. The KLA wanted nothing less than complete independence.

2. NATO’s second demand was “full observance of limits on the Serb army and special police forces agreed on 25 October.” This agreement was reached with the understanding and expectation that the KLA would cease its attack on Serb officials and civilians in Kosovo. Initially the Serbs complied, but the KLA kept up its killing. Was it unreasonable for Serb forces to return to deal with the problem? By 23 February, a month before the Rambouillet talks were halted, NATO had threatened the full might of its power to bomb on behalf of the KLA, had moved troops into Macedonia, and prepared a massive build up of air power. Was it unreasonable for Serb forces to move forward to deal with the anticipated KLA onslaught? If it were reasonable for NATO to build up its forces to attack the Serbs, then surely it was reasonable for the Serbs to build up their forces to defend itself and attempt to drive out NATO’s proxy army, the KLA. The OSCE knew exactly what was going on and why. (19)

3. The final demand was “ending of excessive and disproportionate use of force in Kosovo.” There is a serious problem in assessing what is an appropriate amount of force to use in combating a guerrilla army. The KLA was not a mere one or two dozen young men armed with rifles. When it was officially (though not actually) disbanded on 21 June 1999, as a gesture of disarmament, the KLA handed in 10,000 small arms, 5.5 million rounds of ammunition, and several hundred mortars, machine guns, and anti-tank weapons.

In countering such a formidable threat of violence it is clear and that normal policing methods would not be effective. (20) Evenso, we know from Robin Cook’s statement to parliament already referred to that the KLA used greater violence and caused more deaths than the Serb forces before mid January 1999, and the OSCE report to the UN, covering mid-January 1999 - Mid-February 1999 stated, “In February the level of direct military engagement between the security forces of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) dropped significantly.” The follow-up letter for the next month is not available on the UN web site.

OSCE reports show a steady stream of KLA ambushes and killings with responses from the Serb forces. The Serb response could not be likened to civil policing, and the violence they were dealing with was not normal civil criminal activity. It was a low level civil war in which the KLA were the rebels against legitimate government and the instigators of the violent action. Surely a fair presentation of the facts would state that both sides were using excessive force.

As the Rambouillet talks came to the final stage the US State Department web site recorded on 17 March, “The UNHCR report agrees with the KVM observation that civilian casualties have been "relatively light" in the recent fighting.”

Then there was a change. It took place immediately after the Rambouillet talks were halted, effectively signalling the start of the war. Javier Solana explained what happened in a letter on 23 March to Kofi Annan, Secretary General of the United Nations, “Following 20 March, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has increased its military activities and is using excessive and wholly disproportionate force, thereby creating a further humanitarian catastrophe.” Now the Serbs had moved to the offensive in an attempt to hold as much of Kosovo as they could before the NATO onslaught began.

Having listed the “rejected demands” which were the excuse for the bombing Javier Solana stated, “As we warned on 30 January, failure to meet these demands would lead to NATO to take whatever measures were necessary to avert a humanitarian catastrophe. . . Efforts did not succeed, due entirely to the intransigence of the FRY government.”

Almost as an afterthought, it seems, he continued, “As we have stated, a viable political settlement must be guaranteed by an international military presence.” It is strange that he used such a vague term when NATO is specified repeatedly in the Rambouillet document as the occupying force. It is strange, too, that he did not focus on this demand as the one which the Yugoslav government would not and never did agree to. His statement was a very clever deflection of the media from spotting the key to the “failure” of the talks. Clever, but dishonest.

The number of violent deaths in Kosovo between the start of the talks in Rambouillet on 6 February and the end of the talks in Paris on 18 March was probably less than 50 (Serbs and Albanians). This was a serious problem, but could never justify the inflated language used to justify the bombing. In a sane world it could never be an adequate reason for an all-out attack on another country. Javier Solana’s case for bombing Yugoslavia ignores international law, common sense, and morality and is full of confusion, half truths and lies.